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Schneider Electric SA v. Commission of the
European Communities
THE COST OF STIFLING EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
MERGERS
INTRODUCTION
The European Court of First Instance ("CFI" or "Court") made
history on July 11, 2007 when it announced its ruling in Schneider
Electric SA v. Commission.' In this unprecedented ruling, the Court
awarded damages to Schneider Electric, a French electrical component
manufacturing company, in its suit against the European Commission
("Commission"). Never before has a European Community3 court'
I Case T-351/03, Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-2237, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T-351/03 (click
on the second "T-351/03" from the top).
2 Id. The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Community
and acts much like its counterpart in the United States federal government. See Ivo VAN BAEL &
JEAN-FRAN(OIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 7 (Kluwer Law
International 2005). The Commission is charged with two primary duties. See id. The first is to make
sure that the nations with membership in the Community and internal Community institutions
comply with the terms of the Community's founding treaty. The Commission also makes sure that
the Member States and Community bodies comply with directives, regulations, and the decisions of
Community institutions. The Commission's second major function is to propose legislation to the
main legislative body of the Community, the European Council. Id.
The remainder of this Note will discuss only the Commission's activities in European
merger regulation. The Commission is involved in a variety of aspects of merger control. Id. at 7-8.
Initially, companies that have negotiated a concentration deal between themselves are required to
give notice to the Commission that they have reached an agreement to merge. See id. at 2-3. The
Commission then has the power to investigate these proposed mergers (as well as those mergers that
have already occurred without proper notice). See id. at 7-8. The Commission will then issue a
decision as to whether the merger may go forward or whether such a merger would frustrate
effective competition in Europe's Common Market. Id. The Commission also has the ability to
impose fines on companies that do not comply with Community competition law or Commission
orders, and in some instances, the Commission may even order companies that have already merged
to separate. See id. at 8. Additionally, the Commission ensures that the Community coordinates its
regulation efforts with other nations. Id. The Commission also takes a proactive role in the process
by proposing legislation pertaining to merger control and competition law generally to the legislative
arm of the Community, the European Council of Ministers, and by promulgating its own regulations. Id.
3 This Note refers to the European Community, rather than to the European Union,
because this Note discusses Europe's integrated economy, which unlike Europe's unified security
and political systems, is subject to judicial review. RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 19 (2005).
4 There are two primary courts comprising the judicial branch of the European
Community. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 15-17. The Court of First Instance ("CFI") is
a court of specific jurisdiction, and one of the primary areas of jurisdiction the Court is responsible
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ordered the Commission to pay damages to compensate a corporation for
losses it sustained following a Commission decision to prohibit a merger.
Court followers called the decision "scandalous," "shocking," and
"against the grain of the jurisprudence established by the court."5 Other
observers worried that the decision could have dire consequences for the
Commission's budget and future decision-making far beyond this case.6
These onlookers worried that Schneider would incentivize other
companies whose merger plans had been thwarted to sue the
Commission, and that the extraordinary precedent set by Schneider
would compel the Court to rule in their favor.7 As often is said when a
ruling establishes a new cause of action or remedy, critics of the decision
argued that Schneider would open the proverbial floodgates of litigation!
This Note dispels the notion that the Schneider ruling will have
such expansive or far-reaching consequences and argues that the
precedent Schneider set is far from "extraordinary." Indeed, by exploring
recent amendments to the Community merger control regulations and the
European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) and CFI's own jurisprudence in the
field of mergers and competition law,9 this Note concludes that the
Schneider decision is consistent with the overall direction the courts have
taken in the past.
Part I of this Note briefly traces the history of European
competition law from its fledgling roots in the Coal and Steel
Community to the comprehensive rules and procedures characterizing
modem competition law in the current European Community. ° Part II
provides the factual and procedural history that precipitated the CH's
decision in Schneider. Part III argues that although Schneider marks the
first time the Court has ordered the Commission to pay damages for
improperly blocking a merger, the CFI's holding is actually very narrow
for is merger control. Id. at 15-16. The CFI, as its name suggests, is the first court to which
companies or individuals may appeal a Commission decision to prohibit or permit a merger. Id. at
16. The second court of the Community is the European Court of Justice. Id. at 17. Until 1989, the
Court of Justice was the only Community court. See id. In 1989, the CFI was created to ease the
Court of Justice's case load. See id. at 16-17. Since that time, the Court of Justice's predominant role
in merger control has been that of an appeals court. See id. at 17. However, parties to a competition
law action before the CFI can appeal rulings to the Court of Justice on points of law only, which
leaves a great deal of the judicial review of merger regulation to the CFI. Id.
5 Eubusiness.com, Court Orders EU Regulators to Pay Damages in Landmark Case
(Jul. 11, 2007), http://www.eubusiness.com/newslive/I 184158801.64/.
6 Roger Blitz et al., EU to Pay Damages Over Veto of Merger Deal, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 12, 2007, at 7. Critics of the decision seemed to suggest that the Schneider decision
would leave the Commission vulnerable to additional court orders requiring monetary compensation,
and that if this were to occur, the Commission's budget would be stretched beyond repair.
Commentators also seem to indicate that Schneider will force the Commission to review and perhaps
amend the ?rocedures it follows in reaching a final conclusion on a merger. See id.
See id.
8 See id.
9 Competition law is the area of law commonly referred to as antitrust law in the United
States. FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 280.
10 The Coal and Steel Community was formed by the 1951 Treaty of Paris and was the
original predecessor to modem European integration embodied in the European Union. Id. at 3.
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and unlikely to have sweeping implications in the future. Part III also
argues that the ruling is in line with the Court's trend toward reigning in
the Commission's merger control powers. Additionally, this section
argues that the decision conforms with the overall objective of
Community merger control law, which is to encourage mergers in order
for Europe to compete economically with the United States and Japan.
Finally, Part IV explores the Commission's pending appeal of the CFI's
Schneider ruling currently before the Court of Justice, and recommends
that the Court uphold the decision in order to continue to clearly define
the Commission's powers when it opposes mergers, particularly in light
of the Commission's increased regulatory powers under recent
amendments to merger regulations.
The CFI's disposition in Schneider was a significant
development in European competition law; the ruling was the first of its
kind. However, if viewed in light of the CFI and Court of Justice's
("Community Courts" or "Courts") ongoing attempts to reassert
themselves and reverse early deference to the Commission, along with
the Courts' overall goal of promoting European economic
competitiveness, Schneider is more of a baby step than a giant leap. If, as
the evidence suggests, the Community tribunals are attempting to reign
in the power of the Commission, then the Court of Justice should uphold
the CFI's ruling on appeal and thereby ensure the Commission will
approach merger regulation in line with the competitive objectives of the
European Community.
I. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY
The foundations of European Community competition law can
be found in Articles 65 and 66 of the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which formed
the original European Coal and Steel Community." However, the
treaty's application to mergers and acquisitions has been a more recent
phenomenon.' 2 Prior to 1968, the Community actively encouraged
mergers as a mechanism for competing with larger markets in America
and Japan. 3 In fact, in 1965, the Commission issued a memorandum to
the governments of the Member States of the Community recommending
that the national governments encourage "regional concentration" in
order to promote efficiency and thereby increase the Community's
I See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, arts. 65-66, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (expired July 23, 2002) (establishing a framework for competition
regulation in the Coal and Steel Community). The Coal and Steel Community Treaty was the first
step toward European integration. FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 3. After the devastation Europe
experienced during World War II, European integration was viewed as a way to ensure that this level
of destruction would never happen again. See id. at 2-3. By integrating the European coal and steel
industries, the predominate materials necessary to manufacture war supplies, the European nations
determined that waging war against each other would be impossible. ld.
12 See FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 282-84.
13 Id. at 329.
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ability to compete with larger markets. 4 The result was little regulation
or control of the private industries engaging in consolidation. 5 Not
surprisingly, a "European merger boom" took place throughout the
following decade. 6
This boom came to an abrupt halt with the proposed merger of
Continental Can, a German manufacturer of meat and fish tins, with a
Dutch meat and fish can manufacturer. 17 During the "merger boom,"
studies began to show industrial concentrations were increasing
throughout the Community. 8 In response, the Commission attempted to
prohibit the merger between the German and Dutch manufacturers
because it determined that such a merger would have allowed
Continental Can to create and potentially abuse a dominant position in
the market for processed meat and fish containers. 9 Continental Can
appealed this decision to the Court of Justice,2' arguing that the
Commission had no authority to block a proposed merger.2' Although
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") 22 authorized competition regulation, the EC Treaty does
not authorize the Commission to regulate mergers explicitly.23
Nevertheless, the Court read Article 82 in light of Articles 2 and 3 of the






19 Id. at 329-30.
20 The Court of First Instance had not yet been created as the initial court to appeal a
blocked merger. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 17.
21 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 330.
22 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts. 82-83 (formerly arts. 85-86),
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The Treaty of Rome was renamed the
Treaty Establishing the European Community and amended in 1993. FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 6-7.
Subsequently, the Amsterdam Treaty made significant changes to the EC Treaty, including re-
numbering the articles. All subsequent references to EC Treaty articles will cite only to the current
article.
23 Article 81 of the EC Treaty declares that all commercial agreements thathave as their
"object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market..
." are prohibited. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 81. Article 82 prohibits abuses of a "dominant
position within the common market . I.." "d. art. 82.
24 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 330; see also EC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 2-3. Article 2
of the treaty states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities
referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious,
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment
and of social protection,. . . [and] a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of
economic performance ... among Member States.
Id. art. 2. Article 3 of the treaty states:
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as
provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein: ... (b) a
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and convergence of economic performance 25 and developing a system
"ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted ' 26 as
Community goals.27  The Court found that the Commission was
authorized to approve and prohibit proposed mergers because in doing
so, the Commission was enforcing the anti-competitive prohibitions of
Articles 81 and 82.8 The foundations of the Commission's current
authority to authorize and prohibit concentrations with potential to
impact the Community economy were laid with this ruling in Continental
Can.
Following the Court of Justice's decision in Continental Can, the
Commission submitted a proposed merger control regime to the
European Council of Ministers ("the Council") 29 for ratification.3" Nearly
twenty years passed before the Council acted.3 Finally, in 1989, the
Council approved Regulation 4064/89 ("Merger Regulation" or "the
Regulation"), which, upon taking effect in 1990, granted the Commission
the exclusive power to regulate proposed concentrations that are
"incompatible with the common market.
32
Article 1 of the Regulation set the scope of the Commission's
authority by mandating that the provisions set forth in the Regulation
apply to all "concentrations with a community dimension."33 Article 1
further stated that a concentration has a community dimension when the
combined turnover for all companies involved is C5 billion worldwide, or
where each of at least two of the companies involved has a turnover of
€250 million within the Community.34 Article 3 then stated that a
concentration will arise where there is a merger between two or more
independent entities, or where a person or group of people who control
common commercial policy; ... (g) a system ensuring that competition in the internal
market is not distorted; (h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent
required for the functioning of the common market; ... (m) the strengthening of the
competitiveness of Community industry; ... [and] (t) a contribution to the strengthening
of consumer protection ....
Id. art. 3.
25 EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 2.
26 Id. art. 3.
27 Id. art. 2-3; see also, FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 330.
28 Id. at 330-31.
29 The European Council of Ministers is the primary legislative arm of the Community.
VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 12. The Council is composed of delegates from each Member
State. Id.
30 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 331.
31 Id.
32 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 2, 1989 O.J. (L 257) 90 (EC) [hereinafter Merger
Regulation]; see also FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 331. In 1997, the Regulation was amended to expand
the scope of the Commission's authority. Id.; see also Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 OJ. (L
180) 1, 1-6 (EC). In 2004, the Community institutions significantly amended the Merger Regulation.
FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 331; see also Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 1-3 (EC).
33 Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 1.
34 Id.
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one entity purchase assets or control of another entity.35 The article
further established criteria for determining whether joint ventures fell
under the scope of the Regulation, as well as other circumstances in
which a concentration may or may not arise.36
Despite its authority to regulate mergers, throughout the first
year the Merger Regulation was in effect, the Commission essentially
acted as rubber stamp for merger proposals.37 It was not until 1991 that
the Commission issued its first decision blocking a merger under the
Merger Regulation.38 In that case, a French company named Aeropostiale
SNI and an Italian company known as Alenia e Selenia Spa attempted to
merge with Dehaviland, a Canadian subsidiary of Boeing.39 The
Commission effectively stopped the merger, relying on its own factual
determinations that if the merger were allowed, the parties to the
agreement would establish a dominant market position in a specific
segment of the commuter airplane manufacturing industry.' The
Commission found that the parties to the proposed merger would control
fifty percent of the world market for such aircraft and sixty-five percent
of the Community market for the planes.41
Following this initial prohibition of the Dehaviland merger, the
Commission issued decisions throughout the 1990s and early 2000s
opposing a string of high-profile mergers.42 However, by this time many
of the parties involved in these highly publicized business deals began to
appeal the Commission's negative decisions to the CFI.4 3 Just as the
Commission had recently taken an active role in prohibiting mergers, the
Courts too began to assert themselves. In 2002, for the first time, the
CFI' overruled the Commission's decision in a merger prohibition
35 Id. art. 3.
36 Id.
37 See FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 336.
38 Id.; see also Commission Decision IV/M.053, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 61 (EC).
39 Commission Decision IV/M.053, supra note 38, 42-43.
40 Id. at 60.
41 Id. at 49-50.
42 See generally, e.g., Commission Decision COMP/M.2416, 2001 O.J. (L 43) 13
(declaring the proposed merger of Tetra Laval with Sidel incompatible with the common market);
Commission Decision COMP/M.2283, 2001 O.J. (L 101) 1 (declaring the merger between Schneider
Electric and Legrand incompatible with the common market); Commission Decision
COMP/M.2220, 2001 O.J. (L 48) 1 (declaring the proposed merger between General Electric and
Honeywell incompatible with the common market); Commission Decision COMP/M.1741, 2000
O.J. (L 300) 1 (declaring the proposed merger between MCI Worldcom and Sprint incompatible
with the common market); Commission Decision IV/M.1524, 1999 O.J. (L 93) 1 (declaring the
proposed merger between AirTours and First Choice Holidays incompatible with the common
market).
43 See generally, e.g., Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381
(appealing the Commission's decision to oppose a merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel); Case T-
342/99, Airtours plc v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585 (appealing the Commission's decision to
oppose a merger between Airtours and First Choice).
44 Remember that at this point, the CFI has been convened to help ease the Court of
Justice's caseload in particular areas, most notably that of competition law and merger regulation.
VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 16-17.
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case.45 The CFI invalidated the Commission's order prohibiting an
Airtours/First Choice Holiday merger.46 The Court determined that the
Commission had not met its burden to provide evidence sufficient to
prohibit a merger between the parties.47 Later that year, the CFI issued
rulings in the initial proceedings of the Schneider case and the Tetra
Laval case, holding that the Commission needed to have credible
evidence of a dominant market position to block a merger.4"
Each of these decisions exemplify the Courts' unwillingness to
rubber-stamp the Commission's efforts to stymie mergers. They each can
be viewed as efforts by the Courts to reign in the Commission's
exclusive authority in the merger control area and to create a system of
review and Commission accountability. These decisions further
demonstrate the Court's influence in the area of merger regulation; each
led to significant reforms in how the Commission regulates
concentrations. Lastly, these cases reinforce the Community's objective
to encourage mergers and thus allow Europe to compete on the world
economic stage. This tension between the Commission and the Courts on
issues of competition law is fully illustrated in the Schneider cases, as the
next section explores in detail.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF SCHNEIDER
The procedural background of Schneider is composed of three
separate and distinct legal determinations: the Commission decision
prohibiting the merger; Schneider's appeal of this decision to the CFI;
and Schneider's subsequent suit against the Commission, which was also
brought before the CFI. This section explains each of these legal
proceedings leading up to the CFI' s July 11, 2007 decision.
A. The Commission's Decision
On January 15, 2001, Schneider Electric49 announced its intent to
acquire control of Legrand ° by buying Legrand's shares on the French
stock market." In order to comply with Article 4 of the Merger
45 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 338.
46 Id.; see also infra Part Im.A.2.
47 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 338; see also infra Part IIL.A.2.
48 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 338.
49 Schneider Electric is a French firm engaged in the production and sale of electric
equipment. Commission Decision COMP/M.2283, 2004 O.J. (L 101) 1, 1 (EC) ("Schneider Electric
... is the parent company of a group whose business is in the production and sale of products and
systems in the electricity distribution, industrial control and automation sectors. It is active
worldwide.").
50 Legrand is also a French company engaged in the production of component parts for
electrical systems. Id. ("Legrand . . . is the parent company of a group whose business is in the
production and sale of low-voltage switchgear and accessories. It is active worldwide.").
51 Id.
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Regulation, Schneider formally notified the Commission of this proposed
merger on February 16, 2001.52
To reiterate, the Merger Regulation authorizes the Commission
to act on "concentrations with a Community dimension."53 In a March
30, 2001 decision, the Commission determined that Schneider's
proposed acquisition of Legrand fell within the scope of this definition
and thereby commenced an investigation into whether the merger was
compatible with the Community's common market.54 On July 25, 2001-
after the Commission determined that an investigation was necessary, but
prior to issuing a decision on the matter-the period for the public
bidding closed, which left Schneider holding 98.1% of Legrand's stock.55
Under Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation, parties are prohibited from
going forward with a merger while awaiting the Commission's decision
regarding the impact of a merger's competitive effects.56  However,
Article 7(3) provides an exception when the Commission has been
notified of the merger and the acquisition is to be implemented by a
public bid. Pursuant to this exception in Article 7(3) of the Merger
Regulation, Schneider and Legrand, after notifying the Commission,
essentially completed the merger by public bid allowing Schneider to
buy virtually all of Legrand's stock before the Commission issued its
decision. 8
On October 10, 2001, following Schneider's acquisition of
Legrand, the Commission issued a decision. 9 In a comprehensive ruling,
52 Id.
53 Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 1.
54 Commission Decision COMP/M.2283, 2004 O.J. (L 101) 1, 2 (EC).
55 Id.
56 Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 7(1) ( "A concentration... shall not be put into
effect ... until it has been declared compatible with the common market."); see also FOLSOM, supra
note 3, at 334-35.
57 Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 7(2) ("Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the
implementation of a public bid... [which has been] notified to the Commission pursuant to Article
4, [provided that] the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in
question or does so only to maintain the full value of its investments based on a derogation granted
by the Commission under to paragraph 3.").
58 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
59 Commission Decision COMP/M.2283, 2004 O.J. (L 101) 1, 2 (EC). Under the Merger
Regulation, the Commission has four months from the date of announcing its intention to investigate
the proposed merger to approve or prohibit the actions. Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 10(3).
However, in this case the Commission issued its decision well after the mandated four months.
Under Article 10 of the Merger Regulation, once the Commission adopts the decision to investigate
a notified merger, it can order parties to provide the Commission with information under Article 11
of the Regulation. Id. art. 10(4). If the parties fail to provide the requisite information, the mandate
that the Commission must complete its review within four months is effectively suspended. See id.
art. 11(5). In this case, both Legrand and Schneider failed to comply with the Commission's
information requests. Therefore, the Commission was free to issue its decision after the four month
deadline had passed. It is important to note, however, that had Schneider and Legrand heeded the
Commission's request in a timely fashion, the Commission would have been compelled to issue the
decision within the four month deadline. The Commission would likely have issued a decision prior
to the July 25, 2001 closing of the public offer, thereby eliminating the need for a second divesture
decision. See Commission Decision COMP/M.2283, 2004 O.J. (L 101) 1, 2 (EC); see also Merger
Regulation, supra note 32, art. 11(5) ("Where a person, an undertaking or an association of
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the Commission reasoned that the effects of the merger would be felt
most intensely in the Community's low-voltage electrical component
sector because that was the focus of at least half of Schneider's business
and the totality of Legrand's business.6 Ultimately, the Commission
found that the merger would "lead to the creation or strengthening of
dominant positions with the effect of significantly restricting effective
competition."'" The Commission further found that each of Schneider's
proposals to mitigate the anti-competitive effects of the merger were
inadequate.62 Therefore, the Commission concluded that the "notified
merger [was] incompatible with the common market...."'
In the majority of its cases, the Commission closes a case by
issuing a decision, and either party is free to appeal the decision to the
CFI. However, because Schneider had been permitted to buy Legrand's
stock under the public offering exception of the Merger Regulation while
the Commission's decision was pending, the merger had already
effectively taken place.' Therefore, it was necessary for the Commission
to issue a second determination on January 30, 2002 ordering a
separation of Schneider and Legrand.65
B. Schneider's Appeal to the CFI
On December 13, 2001, prior to the Commission's order of
divestiture,66 Schneider brought an action before the CFI to annul the
undertakings does not provide the information requested within the period fixed by the Commission
or provides incomplete information, the Commission shall by decision require the information to be
provided. The decision shall specify what information is required, fix an appropriate period within
which it is to be supplied and state the penalties provided for in Articles 14 (1) (b) and 15 (1) (a) and
the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice."). Schneider later raised this issue in
its appeal of the Commission's decision to the CFI. However, the Court ultimately rejected
Schneider's argument and found that the Commission was legally empowered to issue its decision
acting beyond the four month deadline. Case T-310/01, Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R.
11-4071, 1-4105.
60 Specifically, the Commission determined that businesses involving the manufacture
and sales of "low-voltage switchboards," "cable trays and busbar trunking," and "electrical
equipment downstream of the final panelboard" would be most seriously effected. Commission
Decision COMP/M.2283, 2004 O.J. (L 101) 2, 3 (EC).
61 Id. at 131.
62 Id. Once Schneider learned of the Commission's concerns regarding the merger, it
proposed several options to mitigate the strengthening of its market position. For example, Schneider
proposed to transfer one of its exclusive distribution contracts to another company. Id. at 128.
Schneider also proposed to divest itself of two of its subsidiary companies. Id. at 127. Each of these
proposals were struck down. Id. at 127-28. The Commission also rejected Schneider's attempts to
salvage the merger by eliminating various segments of its or its subsidiary's businesses. See e.g., id.
at 129-30.
63 Id. at 131.
64 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
65 Commission Decision COMP/M.2283, 2004 OJ. (L 101) 134, 144.
66 When the Commission issues a divestiture decision it is ordering that the merger be
undone. In this case, the order to divest meant that Schneider was compelled to sell its
controlling interest in Legrand either on the open market or by a deal negotiated with another
buyer. Schneider chose the latter course of action. Case T-351/03, Schneider Elec. SA v.
Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-2237, 54, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?
20081
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Commission's decision declaring the merger incompatible with the
common market.67 Schneider based its appeal on several procedural
irregularities during the pendency of the proceedings, including the
Commission's decision to grant itself an extension of four months to
issue a decision on the merger.6" Schneider also contended that the
Commission had violated the company's rights of defense.69 Schneider's
rights of defense claim focused on Article 13 of the Merger Regulation,
under which the Commission is required to produce a "statement of
objections" to the proposed merger, thereby allowing the parties a fair
opportunity to defend or mitigate the proposal.70 In its appeal, Schneider
charged that the list of objections that the Commission provided did not
include the same objections that the Commission ultimately relied on in
its finding that the merger would impede competition in the common
market.7
After appealing the Commission's decision, but before the CFI
had issued its ruling, Schneider entered into an agreement with
WendelIKKR ("Wendel").72 The July 26, 2002 agreement stated that
Wendel would buy the Legrand stock from Schneider should the
Commission prevail in Schneider's appeal.73 Under the agreement,
Wendel would pay far less to acquire the stock from Schneider than the
market rate Schneider had originally paid.74 While this would result in a
serious economic blow to Schneider if the CFI ruled against its appeal,"
Schneider presumably projected the loss of the sale to Wendel to be less
than the loss it would sustain by selling the Legrand stock on the open
market. The parties also agreed that the contract would expire on
December 10, 2002 if not executed prior to that date.76
On October 22, 2002, the CFI issued its decision, ultimately
finding for Schneider and annulling the Commission's decision to
prohibit the merger.77 However, the Court rejected Schneider's argument
that the Commission had illegally issued a decision after four months had
lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T-351/03 (click on the second "T-351/03" from the top).
67 See generally Case T-310/01, Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4071.
68 See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Schneider, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-4098-99.
69 Schneider, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-4097-98.
70 Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 13.
71 See Schneider, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-4094. This is important because the list of objections
that the Commission provides to parties to a merger are used as guidelines by those parties to
propose solutions that would mitigate the Commission's concerns regarding anti-competitive
practices. Thus, in this case, Schneider based its mitigating proposals (that were ultimately rejected
by the Commission as ineffective to reduce the anti-competitive nature of the merger) on the list of
objections the Commission provided. See FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 291.
72 Press Release, Court of First Instance, Schneider Must Be Partially Compensated for
Loss Sustained as a Result of the Illegal Prohibition of its Merger with Legrand (July Ii, 2007)





77 Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4071,1-4196.
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passed, as well as Schneider's plea that under Article 10(6) of the Merger
Regulation, as a result of the Commission's inaction within the requisite
four month time period, the merger should have been declared
compatible with the common market automatically.7"
In the central holding of the case, the Court determined that the
Commission had violated Schneider's rights of defense.79 In making this
determination, the CFI focused on the fact that when the Commission
issued its decision in 2001, it concluded that a merger between Schneider
and Legrand would lead to "buttressing," or unduly strengthening
Schneider's competitive influence"° in a specific sector of France's
regional electrical component market." However, the Commission had
not previously included this "buttressing" objection in the list of
objections it was required to make available to Schneider pursuant to
Article 13 of the Merger Regulation. 2 Unaware of these additional
hurdles to the Commission's approval of the merger, Schneider was thus
unable to thoroughly propose solutions that may have mitigated the
Commission's concerns.8 3 As a result, the CFI concluded that the
Commission interfered with Schneider's rights of defense.'
Schneider also brought a second action against the
Commission. 5 In this second action, Schneider sought to annul the
Commission's follow-up decision ordering Schneider to divest itself of
Legrand stock. 6 Not surprisingly, the Court again ruled in favor in
Schneider and annulled the Commission's order to divest.8 7
78 Id. at 11-4081.
79 Id. at 11-4195-96.
80 Specifically, the Court accepted Schneider's argument that the Commission relied
heavily on its determination that the merger would impermissibly strengthen Schneider's dominant
position in the French electrical panelboard sector in making its decision. Id. at 11-4186-87. When
the Commission issued its list of objections, it focused on the dominant position that would result
from the merger in several geographical areas but did not focus on France. Id. Furthermore, the list
did not mention this dominant position with regard to panelboards. Id. The Court found that this
discrepancy was enough to deprive Schneider of its right to offer a relevant defense to the charge or
to propose solutions to the Commission's concerns. Id.
81 Schneider Press Release, supra note 72.
82 Schneider, 2002 E.C.R. at 11-4186-87.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 11-4186-97. In basing its ruling on the violation of Schneider's rights of defense,
the CFI focused on Schneider's inability to adequately defend against objections to the merger:
The effect of those irregularities [referring to the discrepancies between the Commission
listed objections and those it relied on in the decision] is all the more serious, because, as
the Commission stated several times at the hearing, remedies are the only means of
preventing a concentration falling under Article 2(3) of Regulation No 4064/89 from
being declared incompatible.
Id. at 11-4196.
85 See generally Case T-77/02, Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4201.
86 d at 11-4211.
87 Id. at -4215.
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C. How Schneider Won the Case and Lost Over C1 Billion
Immediately following the CFI's annulment of its prior
decisions, the Commission resumed its investigation into the
Schneider/Legrand merger.88 Despite the Court's ruling, the Commission
continued to express to Schneider that the merger may still be
incompatible with the common market because it would allow Schneider
to corner such a large segment of the electrical component market and
thereby potentially stifle competition that is beneficial to consumers.89 As
a result of the Commission's persistent position that the merger may
continue to run afoul of the common market, and no evidence that the
Commission was nearing completion of its revised determination,
Schneider executed its agreement with Wendel." This deal, which took
place on December 10, 2002, just before the opportunity was about to
expire, caused Schneider to sell its shares of Legrand stock to Wendel at
a loss of over El billion.9 However, if Schneider had let the deal with
Wendel expire and the Commission then issued another decision against
the merger forcing Schneider to sell its Legrand stock at the market rate,
Schneider would have risked even greater losses. On December 13,
2002, just days after Schneider executed the agreement with Wendel, the
Commission closed its investigation into the Schneider/Legrand merger
without issuing another decision.92
D. Schneider's Suit for Damages
Seeking to recoup the losses from the deal with Wendel,
Schneider filed suit in 2003 against the Commission once again in the
CFI.9 3 Schneider argued that it was entitled to damages because the
Commission illegally prohibited its merger with Legrand supporting its
claim with specific reference to the CFI's prior holding that Schneider's
rights of defense relating to the buttressing objection had been violated.94
88 Article 10(5) of the Merger Regulation provides that once the court has annulled a
decision of the Commission, in effect the clock is reset, and the Commission is given a fresh start to
re-investigate the merger. Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 10. In its plea before the Court,
Schneider argued that giving this provision effect when the Court determined that the Commission's
decision was issued illegally would be inequitable since it would give the party who had acted
inappropriately further opportunity to do so. Schneider I, 2002 E.C.R. at 11-4106. Schneider raised
this argument in conjunction with its argument that the Commission had illegally issued a decision
beyond the four month deadline. Id. However, as the Court ruled that the Commission had acted
within the appropriate time period, it did not address the issue further. Id.
89 See Schneider Press Release, supra note 72.
90 Case T-351/03, Schneider Elec. SA v. Comnm'n, 2007 E.C.R. H-2237, 1 54, available
at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T-351/03
(click on the second "T-351/03" from the top).
91 Schneider Press Release, supra note 72.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Schneider, 2007 E.C.R. 127; see also notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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Schneider also argued that there were other procedural defects in the
merger control procedure.9 "
On July 11, 2007, the Court issued its decision.96 The Court
accepted Schneider's buttressing and rights of defense argument, but like
before, rejected the idea that the merger control procedure was flawed.97
The Court ordered the Commission to pay Schneider's expenses related
to the re-opening of the investigation following the CFI's 2002
annulment of the Commission's non-compatibility finding.98 In finding
non-contractual (tort) liability on the part of the Commission, the Court
thus ruled that the Commission's violation of Schneider's rights of
defense met the high bar for tort liability by a European Community
institution, namely that the violation was (1) unlawful conduct, and (2) a
"grave and manifest disregard of the limits of [the Commission's]
powers of assessment."
99
In calculating damages, the Court went further than it had in past
decisions. The Court ordered the Commission to pay two-thirds of the
loss sustained by Schneider when it sold its shares of Legrand to
Wendel.1°° In determining the extent of the Commission's liability, the
Court also ruled that Schneider should not be allowed recover the full
amount of its loss from the divesture to Wendel because, in buying the
stock in the first place, it had assumed the risk that the merger would be
declared incompatible with the common market and therefore must bear
one-third of the loss. 10 1 In effect, the Court ruled that a breach of
Schneider's rights of defense, of which there was prima facie evidence
from the 2002 ruling, was an illegal act so serious that it could be
considered a "grave and manifest disregard of the limits of the
[Commission's] power.
' ' 02
Less than a month later, the Commission issued a press release
stating its intention to appeal Schneider's award to the Court of Justice."°3
The Commission also questioned whether its breach of Schneider's
rights of defense in the case was serious enough to withstand the
standard for tort liability."° Currently, the appeal is still pending.
95 Schneider Press Release, supra note 72; see also Case T-310/01, Schneider Elec. SA
v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071, 11-4098-99 (Schneider argued that the Commission should not
have been allowed extra time to make its determination and that there were serious analytical errors
in the Commission's assessment of the effect the merger would have on the common market.);
Schneider, 2007 E.C.R. 160, 225, 238.
96 See generally Schneider, 2007 E.C.R. 11-2237.
97 Schneider Press Release, supra note 72; see also Schneider, 2007 E.C.R. 167.
98 Schneider, 2007 E.C.R. at Interlocutory Judgment 1.
99 Schneider Press Release, supra note 72; see also Schneider, 2007 E.C. R. 115.
100 Id. at Interlocutory Judgment 11.
101 Schneider Press Release, supra note 72.
102 Id.
103 Press Release, European Commission, Commission to Appeal to Court of Justice
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III. SCHNEIDER: A DEPARTURE FROM THE COURTS'
JURISPRUDENCE?
An examination of the CH and the Court of Justice's merger
control jurisprudence reveals that the Courts have been guided by two
overarching goals. First, the Courts, in particular the CFI, have been
guided by the desire to provide an effective check on the exclusive and
seemingly unlimited power of the Commission in the area of merger
regulation. This goal has gained increasing importance in light of the
2004 amendments to the Merger Regulation. Second, the Courts have
attempted to promote a founding goal of European integration, namely to
create a stronger economic force to compete with the United States and
Japan. 1°5 Mergers can lead to efficiency and increased capital, and the
Courts' merger control jurisprudence takes this into account. The CFI's
decision in Schneider is remarkable not only for the fact that it opens the
door for other companies to sue for damages when the Commission
illegally blocks their mergers, but for the fact that by adding a layer of
judicial review, Schneider was the next logical step in a progression of
decisions limiting the Commission's "exclusive" control over mergers.
Schneider is equally important for reaffirming the Courts' commitment
to promoting mergers as a way to increase Europe's role as a major
economic player on the world stage. It therefore seems that the CFI's
decision in Schneider is neither "scandalous" nor "against the grain of
the jurisprudence established by the court"'" when the Courts' record is
viewed in light of the two overarching goals of providing an effective
check against Commission power and promoting European economic
dominance by encouraging efficient mergers.
A. Checks and Balances
In determining why the CFI and Court of Justice's decision-
making has been guided by the desire to reign in the Commission's
power, it is helpful to describe exactly the scope of authority the
Commission has in controlling mergers. The main source of the
Commission's authority is the Merger Regulation, which was enacted
under the authority of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty."°
105 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 329.
106 Eubusiness.com, supra note 5 (quoting competition expert) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
107 EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 81-82. Article 81 states that any action by either
Member States or private entities which has the effect of "prevent[ing], restrict[ing] or distort[ing]
competition" within the Community is prohibited, while Article 82 provides that any abuse of a
"dominant position within the common market" is prohibited. Id.
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1. The Commission's Powers to Regulate Mergers
The Commission plays "the preponderant role in the
development and enforcement of EC competition law"' 8 and enjoys
tremendous power to investigate concentrations." Beginning in 1962,
the Commission was granted investigative powers under Regulation
17. " 0 These powers included the ability to require parties proposing a
merger to provide information requested by the Commission and to
"submit to on-the-spot investigations,.'' as well as charge fines or issue
injunctions against a proposed merger."2
Regulation 17, which was enacted in 1962 before the merger
booms of the 1970s,"3 was just the beginning of the Commission's
authority to regulate in this area. As mentioned above, it was not until the
original Merger Regulation of 1990 was enacted that the Commission
had exclusive jurisdiction over concentration control."4 This exclusivity
is somewhat of an anomaly within the European Community where
institutions are compelled to share power with each other in almost every
other aspect of law-making." 5 For example, most Community legislation
is proposed by the Commission and passed by the Council of Ministers,
which may or may not have to consult with the European Parliament," 6
depending on the subject matter of the legislation." 7
The Merger Regulation grants the Commission the sole authority
to determine whether the proposed concentration falls within the scope of
108 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 7. Additionally, "[i]t is clear ... that the
Commission is at the core of the development of EC competition policy and that it enjoys broad
powers.... [T]he Commission acts in various instances as legislator, as prosecutor and as decision-
maker." Id. at 12.
109 See Tony Reeves & Ninette Dodoo, Standard of Proof and Standards of Judicial
Review in European Commission Merger Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1034, 1035-36 (2006).
Commenting on the broad range of the Commission's authority to regulate mergers, Reeves and
Dodoo remarked:
[T]he Commission not only enjoys wide investigative powers, akin to those of a public
prosecutor, it also is the sole arbiter, in the first instance, of whether the merger is
anticompetitive or not, and has the power to enforce its decisions by imposing fines, other
conditions, or ultimately, by prohibiting the merger from taking place.
Id.
H0 Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 204. Regulation 17 was replaced by
Regulation 1/2003 on May 1, 2004. VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 8. Under the new




113 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
114 See generally Merger Regulation, supra note 32 (laying out the standards and
procedures that the Commission is to use in regulating mergers); see also FOLSOM, supra note 3, at
331; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
IN See FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 31-32.
116 The Parliament is the Community's other legislative body. Id. at 32-33.
1I Id. at 31-32.
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its authority."' If it so determines, the Commission has the power to
regulate the merger proposal, including the power to suspend the parties
from going forward with their plans." 9 This authority can have a
significant impact in a market economy where a deal may be
advantageous to one or both parties one day but not the next. Most
significantly, Article 8 grants the Commission decision-making power,
declaring that the Commission is the sole arbiter of whether the proposed
concentration is "incompatible with the common market."' 2 Article 11
grants the Commission far-reaching investigative powers, allowing the
Commission to "obtain all necessary information from the Governments
and competent authorities of the Member States, from.. . persons...
and from undertakings and associations of undertakings.'' Under
Article 12, the Commission even has the power to compel the
governments of Member States to initiate investigations upon request of
the Commission.
122
The real teeth of the regulation is in Article 13, which details the
express powers of the Commission to investigate the merger proposals.
Under this article, the Commission is authorized to "examine the books
and other business records"'' 23 of the undertaking, "take or demand copies
of or extracts from the books and business records,"' 24 "ask for oral
explanations on the spot,"'125 and "enter any premises, land and means of
transport of undertakings."'26 Article 14 outlines the fines that the
Commission may impose for failure to comply with these demands.
17
These investigative powers give the Commission a great deal of
unchecked power because the Commission "may request all information
it considers necessary."' 28 This is particularly troubling in light of the fact
that the Commission does not recognize traditional attorney-client
privileges.2 9 Communications between corporations and their in-house
counsel are not protected by the privilege. 30 The same is true for
communications between a corporation and an attorney who is not
licensed to practice law in the European Community.' This may have
particularly dire consequences for North American companies seeking to
become involved in a merger with a Community corporation.
118 Merger Regulation, supra note 32, art. 6.
119 Id. art. 7.
120 Id. art. 8(3).
121 Id. art. lI(I).
122 Id. art. 12().
123 Id. art. 13(l)(a).
124 Id. art. 13(l)(b).
125 Id. art. 13(l)(c).
126 Id. art. 13(l)(d).
127 Id. art. 14.
128 FOLsOM, supra note 3, at 288 (emphasis added).
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The Commission's investigative powers further derogate from
the due process norms found in the democratic traditions of the Member
States. Most notably, the parties to a proposed merger have "limite4
rights to notice and hearing."' 3 2 Additionally, the parties have no access
to the information that the Commission has collected from them. 
133
The only check on the Commission's tremendous investigative
powers is the judicial review of the Commission's decisions provided by
the CH and Court of Justice."M As the Community celebrated the tenth
anniversary of the first Merger Regulation in 2000, the need for more
effective judicial control to check the Commission's seemingly unlimited
authority was a central theme throughout the anniversary celebrations.'35
The noted European competition scholar Sir Christopher Bellamy
remarked that "[i]f there is a gap in the present system where there is
some room for improvement, it is in effective judicial control in merger
cases."'136 For the past decade, both the CFI and the Court of Justice had
been effectively, if subtly, circumscribing the Commission's dominance
in merger control. In 2002, two years after Sir Bellamy's remarks, the
CFI heeded his call by overturning a high profile series of Commission
decisions prohibiting mergers, including the first Schneider case.'3 7
2. The Courts' Effort to Limit the Scope of the Commission's
Merger Control
The CH has consistently adhered to its twin objectives of
curbing Commission power and promoting European economic growth
through protection of the merger process. It has done so in a variety of
ways, from providing procedural mechanisms to allow a greater number
of parties to challenge a Commission decision, to overturning a series of
Commission decisions resulting in a greater movement for reform of the
merger regulation process. A review of the CFI and Court of Justice's
responses to the Commission's merger decisions in 2002 sets the
Schneider decisions firmly in line with the Courts' progression of
asserting judicial review and promoting the Community's economic
goals.
132 Id. at 289.
133 Id.
134 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 12.
135 See Rachel Brandenburger & Thomas Janssens, European Merger Control: Do the
Checks and Balances Need to be Re-Set?, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE
LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY, 135, 175 (Barry Hawk ed., 2002).
136 Id.
137 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 16.
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a. Airtours, Tetra Laval, and Schneider
The three blockbuster competition law judgments that the CFI
issued in 2002 were Airtours PLC v. Commission,3 ' Tetra Laval v.
Commission,'39 and Schneider Electric SA v. Commission.'" In these
three cases, each decided in quick succession, the CFI annulled the
Commission's prohibition of the proposed merger and demonstrated that
the Court was willing to provide a heightened level of judicial review in
order to curb the Commission's alleged infringement of the
concentrations' rights.14'
In Airtours, the Commission prohibited a merger between
Airtours, a British company engaged in the sale and operation of
vacation packages, and First Choice, another British vacation company,
and one of Airtours' competitors. 42 Before Airtours, the Commission
prohibited only those mergers that would result in leaving only two
major competing businesses in a given sector.'43 Airtours was a departure
from this practice because the Commission prevented a merger which
would have left three major competing companies in a market where
there had previously been four.'" The Commission determined that since
the three remaining competitors would have held over 80% of the market
in package vacations in the United Kingdom,'45 it would be nearly
impossible for a new business to enter the market, and there would be an
incentive for the three remaining players to collude to keep prices high.'"
Therefore, the Commission determined that the proposed merger would
have created a "dominant position" in the "short-haul foreign package
holidays" sector of the United Kingdom's economy and determined
accordingly that the merger was incompatible with the common
138 Case T-342/99, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
139 Case T-5/02, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381.
14' Case T-310/01, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071.
141 See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 12. Tetra Laval, the 2002 ruling in
Schneider, and Airtours are commonly cited as examples of the CF's willingness to closely examine
the Commission's merger decisions.
In recent years, the Court of First Instance in particular has made it abundantly clear that
the Commission does not have free reign, and the exercise of its discretion in the
decision-making process has been subject to increasingly rigorous scrutiny by the
European Courts. In several major cases, such as Tetra Laval, Schneider Electric,[and]
Airtours... the Court of First Instance has imposed limits on the Commission's actions.
Id.
142 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. at U-2593.
143 VAN BAEL & BELuS, supra note 2, at 823.
144 Id.
145 See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 824 (If the merger went through,
Airtours/First Choice would have owned 34.4% of the market while the two remaining competitors,
Thomas Cook, and Thomson would have held 20.4% and 30.7% of the market, respectively.).
146 Id.
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market. 47 Airtours appealed the Commission's decision to the CFI in
December of 1999.148
The Court ruled that the Commission had not provided enough
evidence to support its contention that the merger would create a
collectively dominant position in the United Kingdom.49 More
importantly, the CFI laid down three conditions that must be met before
the Commission can block a merger on the basis that it would create or
strengthen a dominant position. 5 ° First, in each case there must be
"sufficient market transparency"'' such that each of the remaining
competitors are able to determine whether their competitors are in fact
adhering to any price fixing or common position that they may adopt.
152
Second, the ability to maintain a common position between the
competitors must be "sustainable over time."'53 In other words, members
of the group who choose to engage in a collective course of action must
have a sustainable enforcement mechanism to prevent other members of
the group from derogating from that plan.l" This deterrent is necessary
because all members must stick to the common position for any of them
to benefit.'55 Third, the collective position must be able to withstand new
competitors entering the market and prevent consumers from reacting to
price increases following the merger.'56
In Airtours, the Court found that the Commission had
misinterpreted the facts at issue, and that these three factors were not
present in the merger between Airtours and First Choice. 157 The CR
therefore annulled the Commission's decision. 15 In doing so, the CFI put
an important check on the Commission's ability to prevent mergers. The
Court also demonstrated that not only will it assess the Commission's
legal procedure, but it will also scrutinize the facts that the Commission
relied on and interpreted in its decision-making.
Following the favorable CR decision, Airtours, like Schneider
Electric would later do, filed an action against the Commission seeking
damages for the losses the company sustained as a result of the merger
prohibition."' This action was filed prior to the Court's most recent
147 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. at IH-2595; see also C.J. COOK & C.S. KERSE, E.C. MERGER
CONTROL 173 (2000).
148 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. at 11-2595-96.
149 Id. at 11-2693.
150 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 824.
151 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. at 11-2613.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 338.
155 Id. at 11-2614.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 11-2693.
158 Id.
159 Case T-212/03, MyTravel Group v. Comm'n, 2003 O.J. (C 200) 28. Airtours is now
known as MyTravel Plc. Id.
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Schneider decision awarding damages, and was therefore not filed as a
result of the favorable precedent set by the Court. However, it was often
cited as an example of how the CFI's Schneider ruling would lead to
opening the floodgates of litigation and would impose serious concerns
for the Commission's budget. This argument was proven unfounded on
September 9, 2008, when the CFI announced its decision in MyTravel
Group plc v. Commission."° The Court dismissed MyTravel's (formerly
Airtour's) claim for damages, finding that the Commission's errors, as
established in Airtours, were not serious enough to establish the
necessary elements of non-contractual liability.' 6' The CFI's decision was
consistent with its ruling in Schneider because the basis for MyTravel's
appeal was a misinterpretation of the facts, which is less serious than the
Commission's infringement on rights of defense, and therefore did not
constitute a "grave and manifest disregard of the limits of their powers of
assessment," which is necessary for the finding of non-contractual
liability.
62
Tetra Laval is the second of the major competition decisions the
CFI issued in 2002 that circumscribed the Commission's authority. In
this case, the Commission prohibited a merger between Tetra Laval SA,
a French manufacturer of plastic food packaging, and Sidel SA, a French
manufacturer also engaged in the manufacture of plastic packaging,
particularly bottles. 63 The Commission ruled that the merger was
incompatible with the common market because it would create and
strengthen the merged entity's position in certain sectors of the plastic
packaging market."
Tetra Laval appealed the Commission's decision to the CFI,
where the decision was annulled. 165 As it did in Airtours, the CFI
heightened the standard of proof required for the Commission to prohibit
a conglomerate merger. 166 The CFI ruled that since the conglomerate type
of merger is generally considered to be positive for the market, or at least
neutral, the Commission was required to engage in "precise examination,
supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which allegedly
produce those [anti-competitive] effects."' 167 The Court found that the
Commission had not met its burden in the instant case, and annulled the
decision.
16
160 Case T-212/03, MyTravel Group v. Comm'n, 2008, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri--CELEX:62003A0212:EN:HTML.
161 Id.
162 Schneider Press Release, supra note 72; see also EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 288.
163 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 1-438 1, 11-4395-96.
164 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 887.
165 Tetra Laval, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-4515.
166 Reeves & Dodoo, supra note 109, at 1052-53.
167 Tetra Laval, 2002 E.C.R. at U-4447.
168 Id. at 11-4513-14.
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On appeal to the Court of Justice, the Commission argued that
the CFI's standard imposed a burden that was impossible for the
Commission to meet. 69 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice upheld the
CFI's decision, although with somewhat softer language, holding that
"[a] prospective analysis of the kind necessary in merger control must be
carried out with great care since it does not entail examination of past
events ... or of current events, but rather a prediction of events which
are more or less likely to occur."'7 ° Both the CFI's decision and the Court
of Justice's affirmation of the decision further demonstrate the
willingness of the Community Courts to subject the Commission to close
scrutiny in the face of its strong investigative powers and exclusive
competence to regulate mergers.' 7
As described above, in the CFI's 2002 Schneider ruling, the third
of the 2002 merger restraint cases, the CF1 ruled that by relying on
objections in its final ruling that the Commission had not previously
provided to Schneider when it issued its "list of objections," the
Commission infringed upon Schneider's rights of defense in that it
deprived Schneider of the opportunity to introduce alternative proposals
that may have saved the merger.
72
b. Other Important Decisions
Although Airtours, Schneider, and Tetra Laval are the three most
commonly cited decisions illustrating the CFI's willingness to scrutinize
and overturn Commission competition decisions, they are by no means
the only ones. The following cases provide additional checks on the
Commission's regulatory powers by both expanding standing to allow a
greater number of parties to challenge a Commission decision and
increasing the opportunities for the Courts to review the Commission's
actions. These additional limits that the CF1 and the Court of Justice have
placed on the Commission's powers also reflect the Courts' efforts to
169 Case C-12/03 P, Comm'n v. Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, 148, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm (scroll two-thirds of the way down the page; follow
"C-12/30 P" hyperlink; click on the second "C- 12/03 P" from the top).
170 Id. IN 42-43.
171 See Reeves & Dodoo, supra note 109, at 1054-55. The article discusses the language
of the CFI and ECJ in Tetra Laval:
[Tihe force of the central message which both the CFI and the ECJ delivered to the
Commission [is]: in situations where the effect of a merger is not clearly anticompetitive,
and in particular where that effect is only predicted to occur in the future, the
Commission will need to have a particularly convincing case in order to withstand the
Courts' scrutiny. This is not "because of a new or heightened legal standard of proof." It
is simply the manifestation of a natural process of evolution, whereby the Courts respond
to the increasing sophistication of competition law, economic theory and of the fact-
finding resources available to the Commission.
Id.
172 See supra Part H.B. and accompanying text.
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circumscribe the Commission's merger control powers even if they have
not received the same degree of recognition in the media and scholarly
literature.
The first and most fundamental way in which the Courts have
limited the Commission's authority is in allowing virtually any party
affected by a Commission decision to have standing to sue in court.'
Article 230 of the EC Treaty expressly allows both the parties proposing
the merger and individual Member States to challenge a Commission
decision. 174 In addition, the Courts have allowed third parties to challenge
the Commission's decisions before the Courts when they show that they
have "direct concern" in the outcome of the case.'75 The Courts have
been fairly lenient in determining who has direct concern, in effect
allowing themselves to hear appeals by "any party that has been
genuinely involved in the merger review procedure before the
Commission and that is affected by its outcome ...."
For example, in Air France v. Commission, the CFI held that
when a spokesman for Air France declared that a proposed merger had
no Community dimension, the interests of Air France's competitors were
affected, which then provided the competitors with standing to sue."'
The Court reasoned that if the spokesman's statement was in fact true,
the merger could be implemented immediately, whereas if the proposal
involved a Community dimension, the merger would be subject to the
Commission's review and would not take place until a determination was
made, which included allowing competitors to be heard.'78
The CH has also held that employees' representatives have
standing to bring an action for annulment of a Commission decision.179 In
Comitj Central d'Entreprise de la Socit9 Ggndrale des Grandes
Sources v. Commission,8' using a teleological approach, the Court ruled
that since the Merger Regulation grants procedural rights to the
representatives of employees of an undertaking, and the only juncture at
which the Court is able to review an abuse of those rights is in a
challenge of a Commission decision before the Court, the representatives
of undertaking employees have standing to challenge a ruling of the
Commission before the court. 8 '
The CH's willingness to broaden the scope of who is able to
bring an action against a Commission decision allows for an increased
173 Brandenburger & Janssens, supra note 135, at 176.
174 EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 230.
175 Brandenburger & Janssens, supra note 135, at 176.
176 Id. at 177.
177 Case T-2/93, Air France v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. U-323, 11-341-42.
178 Id.; see also VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 899; Case T-114/02 BaByliss v.
Commn'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-1279.
179 Brandenburger & Janssens, supra note 135, at 176.
180 Case T-96/92, 1995 E.C.R. 11-1213.
181 Id. at 11-1230.
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number of challenges, which provide the Courts with more opportunities
to reign in the Commission. By granting more parties the right to
challenge the Commission's decisions, a greater number of cases will
come before the Courts, and it follows that the Court will be able to offer
necessary review in a greater number of cases. Furthermore, the threat
that a third party such as a labor union or industry competitor could
challenge the decision means that the Commission, to deter annulments
of its decisions, will be more likely to ensure that the rights of all parties
are respected and that any party with a "direct concern" in the outcome
will at the very least have a chance to be heard.
3. The Commission's Powers Following the 2004 Amendments
to the Merger Regulation
The Courts' 2002 high-profile annulment decisions emphasized
the need to significantly reform the procedures utilized by the
Commission for merger review.12 In response, the European Council, the
principle Community institution responsible for promulgating legislation,
enacted a new Merger Regulation which took effect on May 1, 2004.183
One of the most striking features of the 2004 overhaul of the Merger
Regulation is that it expands the roles of the individual Member States of
the Community." And while it is true that this marks an important
departure from the previous merger regime, it is not indicative of the
scope of the rest of the Regulation, which further strengthens the
Commission's powers to regulate mergers.
First, the new Merger Regulation and corresponding Regulation
on Procedure have given sharper teeth to the Commission's fact-finding
abilities.185 For instance, the regulations have increased the penalty for
procedural violations to up to one percent of an undertaking's "total
turnover" from the previous year.'86 A procedural violation can amount to
nothing more than providing the Commission with "incorrect or
misleading" information following a request from the administrative
body. "'87 The Regulation thus allows the Commission the ability to exact a
serious financial penalty for a relatively insignificant or minor error on
the part of the undertaking, as there does not appear to be a scienter
182 See, e.g., Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381; Case T-310/01,
Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-407; Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002
E.C.R. U-2585; see also Reeves & Dodoo, supra note 109, at 1035 (referring to the year 2002 as
"the Commission's annus horribilis").
183 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 1.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 3.
186 Council Regulation 139/2004, art.14(l), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 15 (EC) [hereinafter 2004
Merger Regulation]; see also VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 3.
VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 3.
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requirement for the imposition of the fine.'88 Furthermore, it is unsettling
that such a large fine could be imposed for actions that turn on
potentially subjective determinations. It is in the discretion of the
institution imposing the fine to determine whether or not the information
it was provided with was "misleading," a determination that is highly
subjective. The 2004 Merger Regulation further compounds fears that
penalties will be unjustly imposed by allowing the Commission to inflict
further fines of up to five percent of an undertaking's average daily
turnover from the previous year for every day that it does not conform to
the Commission's procedural mandates.189 Additionally, prior to the new
amendments to the Regulation, it was possible to escape putative fines
from accruing during the period of time the Commission took to
investigate the effects the proposed merger would have on the common
market so long as the parties involved notified the Commission of any
agreement they had reached among themselves.19 However, the new
Regulation eliminated this safe harbor.19" '
The new Regulation has also augmented the Commission's
authority through increased inspection powers.'92 The Regulation allows
the Commission to inspect a corporate facility with or without giving
notice.'93 More importantly, if the Commission can obtain a search
warrant from a local court, it may inspect "private homes, motor vehicles
and other personal property of the corporate directors, managers and staff."'94
There is no offset to the Commission's increased investigative
powers under the 2004 amendments.'95 The fact that the Commission's
powers were increased in the new merger regime despite the Courts'
continuing efforts to provide an effective check on such power may have
been a motivating factor for the CFI to take the next step in Schneider. In
the face of expanding Commission power, the CFI may have been
compelled to ensure that the Commission was reminded that the Court
still intended to exercise ongoing scrutiny of the Commission's decisions
and impose strict judicial review. Perhaps by ordering the Commission to
pay for its interference with a company's rights of defense, the Court
could ensure that the new power to the Commission under the 2004
Merger Regulation did not go to its head.'96
188 See 2004 Merger Regulation, supra note 186, art. 14 (no requirement that the
undertaking intend to act improperly for fines to be imposed).
189 Id. art. 15(1); see also VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 3.
190 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 23.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 3.
193 Id.
194 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 288.
195 See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 3 ("It is worth noting that the strengthening
of the Commission's investigative powers has not coincided with any strengthening of the due
process rights of companies under investigation.").
196 As legislation, the 2004 Merger Regulation should represent the goals of the
Community to the same extent as judicial decisions. However, the Regulation seems to fly in the
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B. Promoting Mergers and Europe's Competition with America
and Japan
The other major goal that has guided the Community Courts in
their merger control jurisprudence has been their position that mergers
are fundamentally positive actions for the economy of the European
Community.97 According to this argument, mergers promote efficiency
in industry and allow European businesses to compete with foreign
markets. 9 In addition to curbing the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission, the Courts have used their decisions to ensure that mergers
continue to strengthen the Community economy.
This idea is the driving force behind the CFI's development and
implementation of an expedited procedure to accelerate its review of
Commission merger control decisions. Because mergers are market
transactions, they are often highly susceptible to market fluctuations and
changes in the economy. This reality, combined with the fact that the
appeal of a Commission merger decision generally takes at least two
years, means that in many cases mergers that were improperly prohibited
by the Commission will ultimately be unsalvageable as originally
conceived of, even with a favorable outcome in a proceeding before the
Court.' 99 In response to this problem, the CFI introduced an expedited
procedure to "fast track" cases where there is a particular urgency.2' In
face of the Courts' line of cases circumscribing the role of the Commission. This conflict can be
explained by the political situation surrounding merger regulation. The 2004 Regulation was passed
by a legislature composed of representatives from Member States. Member States have traditionally
been "wary of mergers" and have been particularly opposed to mergers affecting producer markets.
Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Merger Regulation, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 14-15 (2005).
Member States wishing to protect their own regional businesses would naturally support an
increased role for the Commission as a way to protect European-wide mergers which could threaten
local industries. Although the Commission is made up of representatives from each Member State
who pledge to act in the interest of the Community, the Commission's "expansive powers in the
context of merger regulation hinge on its effective representation of individual member state
interests, not the construction of a policy that subordinates those individual interests to a larger
vision of the European [C]ommunity." Id. at 12. The 2004 Merger Regulation also contained
measures which increase the role of national courts and regulators. Id. at 30. These features of the
2004 amendments made the Regulation politically expedient but not necessarily in the interest of
European-wide integration.
197 The original Community competition policy shared this goal. The Commission
focused on prohibiting mergers that would impede the integration of a single market. VAN BAEL &
BELLIS, supra note 2, at 22. Even the language of the Merger Regulation suggests as much, stating
that a merger should be prohibited if it is "incompatible with the common market." Merger
Regulation, supra note 32, art. 2.
198 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 329.
199 Often the aim of filing an appeal is not to salvage the proposed transaction, but to
create favorable precedent for a similar future transaction:
mhe most that merging parties can, in practice, hope to attain through an application to
the courts has been to overturn the Commission's findings, with a view to correcting the
"record" for their future deals, rather than resurrecting the transaction that was prohibited
by the Commission in the first place.
Brandenburger & Janssens, supra note 135, at 178.
200 Id. at 180 & n.219.
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December of 2000, the CF1 amended its Rules of Procedure to reduce the
amount of time it takes to appeal a Commission decision from upwards
of two years to around eight months. 1 Some of the important changes
the amendment made were limiting the period of time third parties can
intervene in a proceeding and authorizing the Court to do away with the
practice of the parties trading a second round of pleadings if the Court
determined the exchange was unnecessary. 2  The introduction of these
measures, though certainly far from perfect (after all, the market can still
change a great deal in eight months), further demonstrates the CFI's goal
of encouraging mergers to take place where possible.
Aside from the procedural measures the CFI has put in place to
further the goal of implementing mergers, in each of the cases mentioned
above, there are elements of the decisions that highlight the Court's
desire to ultimately effectuate more mergers. For instance, in Airtours,
the Court raised the bar of what the Commission needs to prove to
prohibit a merger.2 3 This not only has the effect of curbing the
Commission's powers in this area, but also of ensuring that fewer
mergers will be prohibited from being implemented. 04 Similarly, in
Schneider, in ruling that rights of defense must be respected and
enforced, the Court relied heavily on the fact that had Schneider been
aware of the Commission's actual objections to the merger, it may have
been able to propose solutions and alleviating factors that the
Commission would have found acceptable, and therefore the parties
would have been able to go forward with the merger.
The same is true for the Court's most recent Schneider ruling. By
allowing Schneider to collect damages, the Court has imposed yet
another reason for the Commission to pause and consider all of the
implications of its decisions before prohibiting a merger. The net result is
sure to be more mergers passing the Commission's scrutiny.
201 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 1165.
202 Id.
203 See supra notes 150-156.
204 See Kevin Guerrero, A New "Convincing Evidence" Standard in European Merger
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 249, 282 (2003). The standard articulated by the CH in Airtours will
lead to more mergers not only because it requires the Commission to meet a higher burden of proof,
but also because it gives parties to a potential merger more bargaining power:
Airtours and its "convincing evidence" standard will also give the Commission pause
before prohibiting mergers or seeking unreasonable divestitures or other remedies
without extensive and compelling proof of a merger's tendency toward collective
dominance.
The Airtours decision may embolden corporations in the United States and
elsewhere to refuse to cooperate with the Commission in favor of court proceedings, or,
at the very least, give them more bargaining power in negotiations with the Commission.
The decision could quite possibly lead to an improved market for mergers and
acquisitions in Europe, especially for transactions previously considered too risky before
a more hard-nosed Commission.
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CONCLUSION: THE COMMISSION'S APPEAL TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE
On August 6, 2007, the Commission announced its intent to appeal
the CFI's July 11, 2007 ruling to the European Court of Justice.2 5 In its appeal,
the Commission will argue that Schneider's damage award should be
overturned on the grounds that the CFI's 2002 determination that the
Commission infringed upon Schneider's defense rights, which predicated
the current suit, was not a "sufficiently serious breach" of its obligations.36
Although the Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the
Commission's appeal, there are several compelling reasons for it to
uphold the CFI's decision. First, as a procedural matter, the Court of
Justice's standard of review is somewhat limited. The Court of Justice
can only review a decision of the CFI in merger control on points of law,
not factual determinations.2 7 Therefore, the Court of Justice will have to
consider that Schneider's rights of defense were interfered with as a
factual matter. This established as true, it is hard to imagine more serious
non-contractual liability than an abrogation of a party's rights of defense.
Second, leaving the damage award in place will provide an
important check on the Commission's control over merger regulation. As
mentioned above, this is an area of the law where the Commission
exercises exclusive control with its decisions reviewable only by the
European tribunals. The Court of Justice should continue to limit the
Commission's power, particularly in light of the increasingly intrusive
investigations the Commission is now authorized to conduct under the
2004 Merger Regulation.
Third, the Court of Justice should not be concerned by the
argument that by affirming the CFI's decision the floodgates of litigation
will open and risk bankrupting the Commission. The CFI's holding was
narrow. It pertains to Schneider's rights of defense specific to that case,
which are unlikely to be repeated in any future Commission decision.
This point is clearly illustrated by the outcome of Airtours' suit for
damages. 8 In that case, the CFI demonstrated that it was not willing to
award damages as compensation for the Commission's errors when such
errors did not rise to the level of non-contractual liability. 9 The
Schneider ruling is predicated on rights of defense, and therefore did not
provide convincing precedent in Airtours' suit because that suit was
based on the Commission failing to meet its burden of proof. The CFI
205 Press Release, European Commission, Commission to Appeal to Court of Justice
Against Judgment of Court of First Instance in Case T-315/03 Schneider Electric v. Commission
(Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://europa.eulrapidlpressReleasesAction.do?reference=P/07/1213.
206 Id.
207 EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 225 ("Decisions given by the Court of First Instance
under this paragraph may be subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law
only....').
208 See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
209 Id.
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did not consider failure to meet the burden of proof a serious breach of
the Commission's obligations.21 Furthermore, Airtours filed its suit for
damages before the CFI ruled in Schneider, and thus it was not
influenced by the Schneider outcome to file its own suit."'
Fourth, the increased penalty provisions of the 2004 Merger
Regulation should put to rest any fears about bankrupting the
Commission. By giving the Commission the ability to impose fines of up
to one percent of an undertaking's "total turnover" of the previous year
for a mere procedural violation in the review process, the 2004 Merger
Regulation has provided the Commission with a new source of revenue.
The Regulation also allows the Commission to collect as much as five
percent of the previous year's daily turnover if the information is not
provided in a timely manner, further increasing the Commission's
revenue-generating opportunities.212
Finally, the Court of Justice should continue to be guided by the
goal of European competition merger law to encourage as many mergers
as possible without infringing on consumer benefits. The Commission's
infringement of rights of defense, such as those perpetrated by the
Commission against Schneider, blocks mergers that may otherwise have
been salvaged-often at a substantial cost to the parties involved. The
Court of Justice should continue to bear in mind the original guiding
principle of competition law to support mergers when possible so that
Europe can create an economy to rival the United States and Japan.213
The Community Courts have consistently limited the extent of
the Commission's exclusive control over merger regulation. However,
there are still further reforms needed, particularly in light of the
Commission's strengthened investigative powers under the 2004
amendments to the Merger Regulation.214 In the most recent Schneider
case, the Court took another step in circumscribing the Commission's
power, but there is still more work to be done. Concerns relating to the
lack of attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel and the on-the-spot
interrogation of company employees still need to be addressed. The
Courts have contributed to limits on the Commission's power to block
mergers, and in order for this to continue, the Court of Justice should




212 See supra Part III.A.3.
213 FOLSOM, supra note 3, at 329.
214 See supra Part lII.A.3.
t J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2009; B.A., Villanova University, 2004.
Thanks to the staff of the Brooklyn Law Review and Professor Fullerton for their excellent feedback.
Special thanks to my parents and sister for their constant support and inspiration, and to Rich for his
encouragement and patience.
[Vol. 74:1
